Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ICEB 2001 Proceedings

International Conference on Electronic Business
(ICEB)

Winter 12-19-2001

Designing a Fourth-Party E-Commerce Logistics Center: A Benefit,
Cost and Risk Analysis
Yer V. Hui
Lawrence C. Leung
Gang Fu
Waiman Cheung

Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/iceb2001
This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB) at AIS Electronic
Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in ICEB 2001 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS
Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.

Designing A Fourth-Party E-Commerce Logistics Center:
A Benefit, Cost and Risk Analysis
Using AHP and ANP models

Yer V. Hui*, Lawrence C. Leung**, Gang Fu**, and Waiman Cheung**

*Management Sciences, City University of Hong Kong

**Decision Sciences and Managerial Economics, Chinese University of Hong Kong

November 2001

Acknowledgement: This research is funded by the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong.

ABSTRACT
The global trend of e-commerce and use of information technology is transforming the
business structure of many industries and the air cargo industry is no exception.

The

requirement for information integration is unprecedented in the air cargo industry. The Hong
Kong Government (via Airport Authority) has initiated efforts to establish a high-tech
logistics center, which could allow the leasing of both information infrastructure and physical
facilities without requirement of ownership. Like any public infrastructure project, a vast
amount of investment is required and there is a vast amount of risk involved as well. The
success of such a center depends on the commitment of three parties: the Hong Kong
Government, the Investors, and the Users. While each party plays an important role towards
the center’s success, their interests might differ and in some cases be conflicting. In this
paper, we evaluate the benefits, costs, and risks of such a logistic center using a series of
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Analytic Network Process (ANP) models.

It is

shown that the proposed models can be used to examine the sharing of benefits, costs and
risks such that a design agreeable to all parties can be determined.
(Key words: Fourth-party logistics center, E-commerce, infrastructure project, benefit-costrisk analysis, AHP, ANP)
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1. INTRODUCTION
E-commerce and use of information technology are transforming business structures of
many industries and the air cargo industry is no exception. However, the Hong Kong air
cargo industry comprises of many small-and- medium third-party service providers who are
unlikely to be able to afford the vast amount of capital expenditure required. The Hong Kong
Government (via Airport Authority) has initiated the establishment of a high- tech logistics
center, which could allow the leasing of both information infrastructure and physical facilities
by third-party service providers.
To process an air cargo shipment, a massive amount of information is required. Such
information includes data on shipment, ground carrier, customs, airline, global network, as
well as logistics activities. It is extremely important for shippers, buyers and air cargo
service providers to be able to track and trace the safety, status, location, and delivery time of
the shipment. Leung, Cheung, and Hui (2000) has argued that with cooperation among
industry agents and with e-commerce as an enabler, the air cargo industry can form an ecommerce community network, which enables agents of the industry to develop and engage
in logistics integration (Figure 1).
(Insert Figure 1 here)
Here, different Users can share their information on the community network to seek and
negotiate with new customers or partners, plan and control their logistics processes, and to
process fulfillment transactions. Such a community network would be owned and managed
by the logistics center. The center functions as a fourth-party agent for third-party logistics
service providers, who in turn provide logistics service to companies. Client companies or
agents of the industry can simply plug in and engage in logistic e-commerce activities.
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1.1 Government, Investors, and Users
The Government, Investors, and Users are important parties involved in the fourth party
logistics center (Figure 2).

The Government has an important role in selecting the

appropriate investors, safeguarding the center’s neutrality and in regulating the economic
interests of the Investors and Users. Investors are external companies who will design,
finance, build and manage the center. Users include shippers, forwarders, airlines, integrators,
terminal operators, warehouse operators, distributors, ground carriers, etc. They are the
customers of the center. The various forms of ownership are an important design choice.
Government-owned company, service and management contract, leases and concession
contract, BOT, BOOT, BOO, private company are common options for public-private
involvement in large projects (Gresham and Shlaudeman 2000). Not only does the form of
ownership decide the allocation of interests and control-power between different parties, it
also affects the incentives and behaviors of the parties.
(Insert Figure 2 here)
Other than ownership designs, there are also many design issues on the various features
of information infrastructure and the scale of physical facilities (Figure 3). The features of
information infrastructure can range from stand-alone transactions to full information
integration at the industry level. The desirability of individual designs depends on the level
of involvement between Investors, Users and the Government. If both the Government and
the Users take on minor roles, the Investors would assume all the risk and be unlikely to
venture into a large-scale commitment. Investors’ commitment would likely differ, if the
Government supports the establishment of the center by giving land subsidy and tax shelters.
Both the Government and Investors would likely be enthusiastic if Users of the industry show
commitment of support by assuming a portion of the center’s ownership (via their
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professional associations such as forwarders association, shippers association, trucking
associations, etc.). The Government or Investors could provide loans to these associations,
secured by their member’s future patronage of center. Each individual design of the logistics
center has it own sets of benefits, costs and risks for each party.
(Insert Figure 3 here)
The success of such a fourth-party e- logistics center depends on the commitment of the
Hong Kong Government, Investors, and Users. While each party plays an important role
towards the center's success, their interests might differ and in some cases be conflicting. No
one single party would like to assume the inherent vast risk and the need to have risks shared
among concerned parties is critical to the success of the center. However, a systematic
approach to address risks sharing is missing in the literature. A main reason for this void is
largely due to the formidable task of evaluating tangible and intangible risk elements inherent
in such an infrastructure project.
In this paper, we evaluate the benefit, cost, and risk of a fourth-party logistic center in
Hong Kong using Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Analytic Network Process (ANP)
models. Developed by Saaty (1980), AHP is a widely used multi-criterion decision theoretic
that can incorporate both objective and subjective information. AHP first breaks the problem
into a hierarchy of attributes and sub-attributes. Typically, the overall goal is at the top with
the choice alternatives at the very bottom. The relative importance of sub-attributes with
respect to a given attribute is determined by using ratio scales and paired comparisons. Then,
the methodology respectively aggregates weights of sub-attributes at a lower level to form
weights at a higher level.

The final result would be the relative importance of each

alternative with respect to the overall goal. An important feature of AHP is its capability to
evaluate intangibles, a feature due to its use of relative preferences and ratio scales. When
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there exists relationships between attributes in the same level or of different levels, ANP must
be used (Saaty 1996).
2. BENEFITS, COSTS, AND RISKS TO GOVERNMENT , INVESTORS, & USERS
In this section, we provide benefit, cost, and risk models in the form of either AHP or
ANP for each individual party.
2.1 Benefits to Government
The Hong Kong air cargo industry is in need of innovation and technology to compete
regionally and worldwide. The IT infrastructure for air cargo will enhance Hong Kong’s
strategic role of being a high-tech knowledge-based service economy. The transportation
sector in Hong Kong contributes substantially to the GDP of Hong Kong providing
employment to a significant percent of the population. Job creation takes place in several
ways: jobs for the center itself, jobs from expansion of peripheral industries, and jobs from
the incremental economic growth that the industry creates. The Government will have extra
tax revenue, and in the situation where land is leased to investors, the Airport Authority will
also receive rental income. Figure 4 shows an ANP model depicting the benefits to the
Government. The directed arc represents inner-dependency (Saaty 1996). Table 1 gives the
descriptions of the criteria.
(Insert Figure 4 here)
2.2 Costs to the Government
The Hong Kong Government adopts a laissez faire policy and is not likely to form joint
venture with Investors. While the Government does not invest in the logistics center, it does
incur certain costs. Firstly, new constructions of supporting facilities in the airport are
needed.
Investors.

The Airport Authority will have to expend efforts in identifying and selecting
It needs to form an administrative entity to monitor the development and
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construction of the center and to safeguard the center’s neutrality during its operation. The
Authority must design a contingency plan in the event that the logistics center does not
perform in accordance to specifications either in the construction phase or in the operation
phase. Contingency cost can be a significant cost item. Figure 5 shows the AHP model
according to the costs of the Government. Table 2 gives the descriptions of the criteria.
(Insert Figure 5 here)
2.3 Risks to the Government
For any infrastructure projects, the Government needs to address the risk of failure and
its consequences. It must address whether the macro economic environment supports the
long-term establishment of the center. An important risk is related to the issue of regulating
air cargo infrastructures. It must evaluate the risk of not being able to properly monitor the
development of the center as well as the risk of not being able to safeguard the neutrality of
the center. The risk of improper contingency measures is another risk consideration. The
Government’s involvement can be a market interference issue, which needs to be carefully
examined.

Moreover, the Government’s contractual commitment should be judicious,

balancing unnecessary fiscal burden with prudent commitment to helping the air cargo
industry. Figure 6 shows the ANP risks model. Table 3 gives the descriptions.
(Insert Figure 6 here)
2.4 Benefits to Investors
The primary direct revenue will come from users’ rental fees. This revenue source will
largely depend on the volume of users who lease the service. As the third party information
infrastructure is an e-commerce platform for the industry, there are many revenue generation
prospects from the platform.

The platform will likely be the central source of market

activities, through which Users obtain their business and it could be developed into a major
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regional market to be linked with other international networks. The potential income from
data mining activities on the platform can be substantial. There are also opportunities in
developing partnerships with other electronic businesses as well as partnerships in Asian and
China logistics. Figure 7 shows the ANP model for benefits of Investors. Table 4 gives the
descriptions of the criteria.
(Insert Figure 7 here)

2.5 Costs to Investors
During the initial preparatory stage, investors incur the costs of designing, bidding, and
business development.

In the development phase, Investors incur major costs in the

construction of the physical facilities as well as the installation development of the IT
infrastructure.

The amount of investment varies greatly with the scale of the physical

facilities. Similarly, the IT infrastructure design also dictates the amount of investment
required in the acquisition of hardware and software. Major investment will be needed for
IT-skilled human resource both in the development and the maintenance of the IT
infrastructure. Financing cost is a major cost item in such a large project. The opportunity
cost of investing in the project should be taken into account as well. When the center is in
operation, there would be direct and indirect costs of operating the center. Figure 8 shows the
AHP model according to the costs of Investors. Table 5 gives the descriptions of the criteria.
(Insert Figure 8 here)
2.6 Risks to Investors
The overall risk that Investors must address is the risk of not able to achieve the targeted
return during the planning horizon. There are several categories of risk factors that could
contribute to this overall risk: construction, economic, competition, e-commerce, regulatory,

8

and level of acceptance by Users. Construction risks involve the risk of having cost overruns and the risk of not able to build the center according to the technical specifications. The
principal economic risk is that of slow growth in Pearl River Delta, a production hinterland of
Hong Kong where a major portion of air cargo via Hong Kong originates and destines.
Competition is also a major risk concern. Regionally, while Ho ng Kong is a major air cargo
hub in Asia, competition from major cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou and Singapore will
be keen and could take away a significant portion of business from Hong Kong. Within
Hong Kong itself, other 3rd party logistic centers may be constructed in Hong Kong
competing for air cargo shipments.
Obviously, the success of the center depends on the number of Users that lease the
infrastructure. The uncertainty on the level of User satisfaction is a critical risk factor that is
related to the quality, reliability, pricing, and neutrality of the services provided. But the
highest risk is at the IT front, which is also the feature of the most profitable potential. Today,
competition for B2B e-commerce platforms is fierce and such platform for aviation logistics
is no exception.

This is the main attraction for the Users but there is a great deal of

uncertainty regarding its success and failure as well as its competition. The risk of the
Government over-regulating the logistic center is a plausible concern. Figure 9 shows the
AHP model according to the risks of Investors. Table 6 gives the descriptions of the criteria.
(Insert Figure 9 here)
2.7 Benefits to Users
Logistics agents are primary Users of the center. The overall planning and control of
operations are improved due to better coordination of shipments. Users will be able to
provide better inventory control, and have more effective coordination of integration and
consolidation of air cargo. Waiting time during transit will be minimized and unnecessary
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intermediaries will be eliminated as well. The resulting shipping process is streamlined,
alleviating unnecessary costs in space, handling and inventory. The quality and reliability of
delivery is likely to be improved. With tracking and tracing, Users can update the status of
shipments in process, notice problems immediately and prescribe solutions effectively.
Outsourcing IT capability as well as physical facilities allow logistics service provider to
concentrate on the ir innovation of processes.
(Insert Figure 10 here)
Via the third party infrastructures, logistics agents can customize their services as well
as introduce innovative services at low costs. And with strategic partnerships, Users become
very flexible to adapt their services to the dynamic market. From a technology perspective,
the Users of the center would enjoy benefits such as scalability, security, accessibility and
user friendliness. Interoperability might also be developed. Figure 10 shows the AHP Model
according to the benefits of logistics agents. Table 7 describes the criteria.
2.8 Costs to Users
Startup costs for the Users include the membership fees of the center. To be connected
to the IT infrastructure, initial investment will have to be made on interfacing or hook-up
devices. Users will need to recruit or train IT-skilled staff to become conversant with the
operating environment of the IT infrastructure. Once the connection is made, Users would
incur transaction cost as well as leasing cost of the physical facilities. Figure 11 shows the
AHP model according to logistics agents’ costs and Table 8 gives the descriptions of the
criteria.
(Insert Figure 11 here)
2.9 Risks to Users
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For a third-party e- logistics center, a great deal of users’ business information is
processed through the center. A User’s major concern is whether the center will be capable
of providing secure information processing. Also, since competing companies will be using
the same facilities, neutrality of the center is of paramount importance. Further, once the elogistic platform becomes the central market of air cargo shipments, Investors would control
the market and may levy unreasonable leasing charges. Users should seek guarantee of
neutrality as well as a reasonable pricing policy. While the third-party center means the
availability of IT and physical infrastructure, it also means that the playing field is now
leveled. Some Users might lose their previously established competitive edge. The process
of change is risky in itself. It is common that the employees object to new ideas and new
technology. Figure 12 shows the ANP model according to logistics agents’ risks. Table 9
gives the descriptions of the criteria.
(Insert Figure 12 here)
3. RISK SHARING IN CENTER DESIGN: AN ILLUSTRATION
In the preceding sections, we have provided Benefits, Costs, and Risks models for
Government, Investors, and Users. In this section, we illustrate how a design of logistics
center can be selected using these models. Firstly, it is important to point out the difference
between AHP and ANP. In general, two attributes are independent if they are unrelated (e.g.
color and smell of food) and are dependent when they are related (e.g. taste and temperature
of food). In the latter case, the preference determination between the two attributes requires
assessment of the extent of dependency between them. Problems with dependency may be
implemented using an AHP framework if the decision- maker is capable of factoring in all the
interactions and can directly provide preferences between attributes. For example, when
assessing the relative importance between taste and temperature of food, the decision- maker
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can somehow incorporate the impact that these two attributes have on each other with respect
to a certain criterion and can come up with their relative preference.

However, if the

decision- maker is not capable of doing so, ANP should be used. Within an ANP context, the
property of having interactions between a cluster of sub-attributes is called innerdependency,
and those between attributes of different hierarchy is called interdependency (Saaty 1996).
There is no interdependency in our formulations.
3.1 Solution Methodology of Aggregating Benefits, Costs and Risks in ANP and AHP
A commonly used methodology of ranking alternatives based on Benefit-Cost-Risk is to
determine the ratio of (benefits)/[(costs)×(risks)], where the values inside the brackets are the
corresponding weights from solving individual networks or hierarchies (Expert Choice 1998).
This method has two implicit assumptions. First, it assumes that the criteria of benefits, costs
and risks are equally weighted. Second, it assumes that the alternatives are relatively close in
terms of scale. These two assumptions are not realistic for our problem. Here, the relative
importance of benefits, costs and risks potentially varies with respect to individual situations.
The differing scale of the alternatives is an important feature as well.
Alternatively, we construct an aggregated benefit-cost-risk model for each party (Figure
13). The purpose is to have benefits, costs and risks as three primary criteria under the
overall goal, and to attain their weights by pairwise comparisons. Here, to be able to
compare benefits with costs and risks, we need to seek the decision- maker’s preferences in
terms of their relative importance. For example, we would ask questions such as “With
respect to the overall goal of User, what is the relative importance between benefits and costs
in designing the center?” For preference determination for sub-attributes under costs and
risks, the questions would be designed such that the relative importance of the respective subattributes would correspond to their relative levels of positive contributions.
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(Insert Figure 13 here)
3.2 Aspects in Determining an Agreeable Solution
There are three aggregated benefit-cost-risk models, representing the interests of the
Government, the Investor and the Users. Different parties might not prefer the same design
and we need to examine how to adjust the design such that we can arrive at a design that
satisfies every party. While solving the problem, there are four possible scenarios:
1. An agreeable solution is found immediately. An agreeable solution is a
design that attains the highest priority for every party.
2. There is no immediately agreeable solution but such a solution can be
obtained if a design can be acceptably modified. The acceptable ranges of design
changes are provided by the decision- makers.
3. There is no immediate agreeable solution but an acceptable solution − one
that attains satisfying priority weights or is a close choice to the top-ranked design −
can be obtained immediately or after acceptable modification.
4. No agreeable or acceptable solution exists.
For the last three scenarios, sensitivity analysis is helpful in identifying the critical
design elements, as well as examining the risk sharing between different parties.
3.3 A Solution Procedure based on Sensitivity Analysis
A solution procedure (Figure 14), based on sensitivity analysis, to determine an
agreeable solution is now provided. Sensitivity analysis assesses that how the change of data
input affects the result. Thus we can adjust some model parameters purposely, and change
the results of AHP and ANP models in desired direction. There are two popular forms of
sensitivity analysis: the one-factor-at-one-time approach and the scenario analysis
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(Groenendaal and Kleijnen 1997). The first approach is more suited in our problem, because
it is relatively easy to be interpreted and understood while the scenario analysis might require
too many data inputs.
(Insert Figure 14 here)
For AHP, we use a sensitivity analysis approach developed by Triantaphyllou and
Sánchez (1997). The performance measures under individual criterions are examined one by
one.

The sensitivity of a performance measure is determined by its smallest relative

modification that would change a potential agreeable solution to the top choice. We then
make acceptable modifications on the design. To ensure that the modifications do not make
the design undesirable to other parties, their impacts on the performance measures of other
parties are examined. Since the ANP formulations in our current problem only involve
innerdependency, we construct individual supermatrix for these clusters and attain the
limiting priorities of their sub-criterions. The limiting priorities become the weights of the
sub-criterions. The ANP models are now in AHP form and we could perform sens itivity
analysis in a similar fashion.
Using the solution procedure, we might find that there is no feasible solution based on
the original designs. We can introduce a new set of design alternatives, which are likely to be
feasible, since our understandings of the problem must be improved during the procedure.
On the other side, it is also possible to find several agreeable or acceptable solutions. If it is
the case, we can exclude the infeasible solutions, and retain the priority weights using the
original comparisons between the remained designs. Judgement can be made based on the
new priority weights.
We apply simple rules to certain steps in order to improve the efficiency of the
procedure. For example, at Step 2, we examine modified designs tha t have a relatively high
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geometric mean of the scores. A high value of the mean implies that there are no extremely
low scores, and the design is likely to be acceptable to every party. At Step 3, we examine
designs that are unlikely to be accepted, in order to exclude any infeasible designs as soon as
possible. At Step 8, when examining the impacts of design modifications, we only refer to
the sensitivity performance measures.
4. AN ILLUSTRATIVE NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
To illustrate the conflict-resolving procedure, we develop the following numerical
example. There are three types of designs in this example. We contrive paired comparisons
according to abridged benefit-cost-risk models. The problem is solved with the following
iterations (Figure 15):
(Insert Figure 15 here)
Iteration 1. Design B is the top choice for the Government, Design C for the Investor,
and Design A for the Users. Here, Design C is to be examined at first. Of the three parties,
Users are most unlikely to agree with it.

Sensitivity analysis for Users shows that the

performance measure of Design C under the criterion User Management is the most critical.
A 32% increase could make Design C the top choice. Here, an electronic network that is
highly compatible with the Users’ legacy systems can be designed for Design C. This
modification reduces risks of Compatibility and Resistance-to-Change, which are major subcriterions of User Management. It has no major negative impacts on the performance of
Design C for any party. Such modification is acceptable. Hence, Design C is agreeable to
Users.
Iteration 2. For Government, the performance measure of Design C under Service
Economy is the most critical, which requires a 26% increase to give Design C the top ranking.
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However, to achieve this increase, we need to adopt innovative e-commerce measures and
latest information technologies for Design C. It raises Users’ risks of New Technology and
Security, and the performance measures of Design C under these criteria are quite sensitive.
The modification seems to be infeasible.
Iteration 3. The performance measure of Design C under Economic Growth is the next
most critical for Government. It requires an increase of 40%. However, the performance
measure can only be increased as much as 30%, by enlarging the scale of the center within an
acceptable range. With the 30% increase of the measure, the priority weight of Design C for
Government is very close to that of the top choice. Its priorities for Investor and Users are
not obviously affected. Hence, Design C is acceptable to Government with the modifications.
It is now an acceptable solution to all three parties
Iteration 4. We continue the solution procedure to examine whether Design B is an
agreeable solution. Users are examined first. Sensitivity analysis shows that the most critical
performance measure requires a 38% reduction to make the priority weight of Design B
exceed that of the original top choice (Design A). However, with this change, Design C
attains the top ranking instead of Design B. The next most critical performance measure for
Users requires a 48% change, which is unacceptable. Design B is neither agreeable nor
acceptable to Users.
Iteration 5. Design A is the last design to be examined. For Government, the most
critical performance measure requires a change as large as 62% to make the priority weight
of Design A higher than that of the top choice. Moreover, this change gives Design C the top
ranking. Design A is not a feasible solution.
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All design alternatives have been examined, and the solution procedure stops as there is
no further agreeable solution. With acceptable modifications, Design C attains satisfying
priority for every party.
5. CONCLUSION
A fourth party e- logistics center can enhance the competitiveness of the Hong Kong air
cargo industry, especially in this era of e-commerce and globalization. The Government,
Investor and Users play important roles in the development and operation of such a center. It
is important to select a center design that satisfies all three parties. This selection task is a
challenging one as there are a multitude of tangible and intangible attributes.
In this paper, we provide a series of AHP and ANP models that can be used to evaluate
various design alternatives. These models identify and organize the major attributes of the
benefits, costs and risks to the Government, Investor and Users. They provide a conceptual
framework for the design problem. The three principal parties might differ in their criteria of
center selection and a conflict resolution or risk-sharing approach is needed to seek
convergence. Here, we introduce a solution procedure based on sensitivity analysis. It
examines the risk-sharing problem, and leads to an agreeable solution by modifying the
original center designs within acceptable ranges. Such use of AHP and ANP to resolve
conflict between different parties has received little attention in the literature.
In general, the evolution of web-based information technology has reached the stage
where e-commerce activities and e-business processes are intertwined online, creating a genre
of websites that are both marketplaces and management platforms. For the air cargo logistics
industry, such platforms can take the form of a 4th party e- logistics infrastructure. They allow
logistics service providers to outsource their e-commerce and e-business needs.

An

important aspect in designing such an infrastructure is the assessment of the platform’s
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benefits and costs, as well as the judicious sharing of risks among interested parties. We
believe the present work has provided a framework as well as a solution methodology for
such an endeavor.
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Figure 8. AHP Model for Costs to Investors
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Figure 10. ANP Model for Benefits to Users
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Figure 11. AHP Model for Costs to Users
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Figure 12. ANP Model for Risks to Users
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Figure 13. Aggregated Benefit-Cost-Risk Model
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Figure 15. Iterations in Converging the Choices of Different Parties

Table 1. Benefits to the Government
Criteria

Description

Job Creation

New job opportunities from the logistics center.

Economic Growth

Overall Economic Growth of Hong Kong.

-

Center

Center’s contribution.

-

Air Cargo Industry

Contribution by corresponding development of air cargo industry.

-

Peripheral Industry

Contribution by corresponding development of peripheral industries, such as real estate
and telecommunication industries.

High-tech Service Economy

Contributes towards Hong Kong’s strategic role of being a high-tech knowledge-based
service economy.

Revenue

Government’s revenues that directly come from the center.
-

Land Revenue

Incomes due to land sale or rental.

-

Tax Revenue

Tax collected over the revenue of logistics center.

-

License Income

Payment from selected Investors for the right of building and operating the center.
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Table 2. Costs to the Government
Criteria

Description

Contingency Cost

Cost in the provision of contingency measures.

Initiating & Monitoring Cost

Expenses in initiating the center and monitoring its construction and operation.

-

Land Subsidy

Subsidy in the sale or rental of land to Investors.

-

Public Infrastructure

Construction of supporting public infrastructures, such as transportation system and
telecommunication network.

-

Investor Selection

Cost of selecting Investors and examining center designs.

-

Center Development

Cost of monitoring the construction and further development of the center.

-

Center Operation

Cost of monitoring the regular operation of the center.

Environmental Cost

Noise, pollution, etc.

Opportunity Cost

Opportunity lost for alternative usage of the resources (land and people)

Table 3. Risks to the Government
Criteria
Center Failure

Description
Risk of project failing.

-

Macro Economics
Risk

Downturn of global or regional economies.

-

Competition

Risk due to competition.

-

Contingency

Risk of unsuccessful contingency measures.

Market Interference

Government interference in the free market.

Inappropriate Regulation

Risk of not providing proper regulation.

-

Unfair regulations

Neutrality

-

Over-regulations

Over-regulating brings difficulty to the running of center, while inadequate
regulating is open to abuses.

Risk of Contractual Commitment

Contractual commitments may bring unnecessary fiscal burden to the
Government and taxpayers.

Table 4. Benefits to Investors
Criteria
Revenue

Description
Investors’ incomes from the center.

-

Information Service
Income

Revenues of offering information infrastructures to Users.

-

Facility Leasing
Income

Revenues of leasing physical facilities to Users.

-

License Income

License income from Users.

Potential in Logistics

Business potential in logistics from the center.

-

Hong Kong Logistics

Opportunities in the Hong Kong logistics industry.

-

Asia & China Logistics

Opportunities in the logistics industry of Mainland and other Asian regions.
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Potential in E-commerce

Business potential in e -commerce from the center.

-

Partnership

Partnerships with Users and operators of other e -commerce platforms.

-

E-commerce Database

Business potential from data mining of logistics -related information.

-

E-Logistics Network

Business potential from developing the center’s information infrastructure
into a vertical e -logistics network.

Table 5. Costs to Investors
Criteria
Preparation Cost

Description
Investors’ costs in the preparation phase.

-

License Fee

Fees to Government for permission to construct and operate the center.

-

Transaction Cost

Costs of designing, bidding, negotiating etc.

Development Cost

Investors’ costs in the development of the center.

-

Land

Rental or purchase cost of land.

-

Information
Infrastructure

Cost of establishing information infrastructures offered to Users, including
hardware and software.

-

Physical Infrastructure

Cost of building the physical infrastructures offered to Users.

-

Supporting
Infrastructure

Cost of other necessary infrastructures, such as management information
system for internal use.

-

Financing Cost

Cost of financing the investment.

Operating Cost

Operating costs of the center.
Indirect Cost

Overheads and other indirect costs.

Direct Cost

Direct operating cost of the center.

Opportunity Cost

Opportunity lost for alternative usage of the resources.

Table 6. Risks to Investors
Criteria
Macro Economic Risk

Description
Global and regional macro economic risk.

- Slow Growth to Hinterland

Risk of economic downturn in Pearl River Delta.

- Global Economic Downturn

Risk of global economic downturn.

Construction Risk

Risks incurred in the construction process.

- Cost Overrun

Construction cost exceeds budget.

- Fail to Meet Specifications

Failure to meet the designed technical specifications.

Competition

Competition in logistics business is fierce.
- Asia & Mainland Cities

Competition from major competitors such as Guangzhou and Shanghai.

- Local Competition

Competition from similar projects in Hong Kong.

Users Satisfaction

Users’ satisfaction level with the center.

IT & E-commerce Risk

The uncertainty as well as attractiveness of IT & E-commerce.

- IT & E-commerce Level

Whether the designed IT & E-commerce level is desirable.

- E-commerce Competition

Competition for e -commerce is fierce.
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- Quality & Reliability

Quality & reliability of services offered by the center.

- Pricing

Risk of inappropriate pricing.

Regulation Risk

Risks of regulatory problems.

Table 7. Benefits to Users
Criteria
Effective Planning and Control

Description
Efficiency of logistics operations

-

Inventory Control

Able to develop effective inventory planning for client companies.

-

Eliminate unnecessary
intermediaries

Efficient information avoids unnecessary intermediaries.

-

Minimize waiting time

Use the integrated information system to forecast and plan their work, thus
reducing waiting time at interfaces.

-

Integration &
Consolidation

Allow effective coordination of integration and consolidation of shipments.

Improved Service Quality

Quality of services is improved.

-

Track and Trace
Accuracy

Accuracy in monitoring shipments and logistics services.

-

Responsiveness to
Problems

Minimize human errors, damage and theft, and can identify problems and
prescribe solutions quickly.

-

Mass Customization

Flexibility in customizing processes to meet customers’ different
requirements at low cost.

-

Capacity Flexibility

Virtual partnerships create more options to deliver goods.

Technology Edge

Help Users establish their high-tech capability.
-

Security

Users’ information will be protected by the technology of authentication,
authority and audit.

-

Accessibility

Easy accessibility.

-

User Friendship

Ease of use.

-

Scalability

System upgrading is economical.

Table 8. The Costs to Users
Criteria
Startup Cost

Description
Users’ costs to start using the center.

-

Interface devices

Investments on compatible mechanisms to use the center.

-

Human Resource

Recruiting and training of new staff.

-

License Fee

Payment to Investors for use of the center.

Usage Cost

Users’ costs to use the center’s infrastructures.
-

Information Service Charge

Payment to use the information infrastructure of center

-

Facility Leasing Fee

Payment to use the physical facilities of center.

-

Operating Cost

Additional operating cost related to the using the center’s facilities.
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Table 9. Risks to Users
Criteria
Center Management

Description
Users’ risks from the center.

-

E-commerce

Uncertainty regarding e -commerce.

-

Security

Security of information processing at the center

-

Pricing

Uncertainty on the future pricing policy of the center.

-

Neutrality

Uncertainty on the center’s neutrality.

User Management

Users’ risks from themselves.

-

Compatibility

Incompatibility in integrating with the center’s management as well as
infrastructure.

-

New Competition
Structure

The center changes the competition scenarios.

-

Resistance to Change

Resistance by employees of Users.
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